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1Abstract
This paper examines a mechanism of liquidity-preference ﬂuctuations caused by
people’s learning behavior. When observing a ﬁnancial shock, they rationally up-
date their belief so that the subjective probability of encountering it again is higher,
immediately raise liquidity preference and reduce consumption. As a period without
the shock lasts after that, they gradually decrease the subjective probability, lower
liquidity preference and increase consumption. Particularly, when the shock is ob-
served many times in succession, recovery is ﬁrst slow because people do not easily
change their pessimistic view, then gradually accelerates, and eventually slows down
as they become fully optimistic.
Keywords: Bayesian Learning, Liquidity Preference, Precautionary Motive, Markov
Switching
JEL Classiﬁcations: D83, E41, E32
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
People hold money for a wide variety of reasons. Those discussed in the literature in-
clude the transaction motive, the speculative motive, status preference, and many others.
Among those, the precautionary motive is most closely related to people’s assessment
about economic uncertainty, which evolves over time according to their learning behavior.
In particular, their incentive to hold money depends on their estimates about the proba-
bility of encountering a shock in which liquidity is needed. By observing whether or not
such a shock actually occurs at each point in time, they rationally update the likelihood
of encountering the shock in future, causing their liquidity preference to ﬂuctuate. The
ﬂuctuation then aﬀects the optimal time paths of money holding and consumption, gen-
erating a ﬂuctuation in aggregate demand. This paper develops a theoretical framework
that captures this idea and investigates the pattern of decline and recovery in aggregate
demand.
We consider a situation where people hold money to prepare for a possible aggregate
liquidity shock, such as bank runs or ﬁnancial system collapses. At normal times, they can
settle transactions without money by relying on credit cards or other forms of short-term
credits. However, once a ﬁnancial crisis occurs and obtaining credits becomes diﬃcult,
holding money stock yields an explicit beneﬁt. Bank runs can also be regarded as another
example of such liquidity shocks. As long as banks normally operate, people need not hold
money since they can easily withdraw deposits. Only when a bank run occurs, holding
money generates utility. However, since such a crisis cannot exactly be anticipated, people
have an incentive to hold money anytime.
Obviously, the expected beneﬁt from holding money is larger when the probability of
encountering the liquidity shock is higher. Note that the shock probability is not necessarily
constant over time. For example, Japan has experienced a number of bank failures in the
1990s whereas there were very few before, implying some underlying conditions for the
economy changed in that period. If people know the possibility of such a structural change
3but cannot directly observe it, an occurrence of the shock aﬀects not only their current
utility but also their belief about the current underlying state of the economy.1 More
precisely, when people observe the shock, they strengthen the belief that they are in a
dangerous state, increase their subjective probability for meeting with the shock again,
and raise liquidity preference. Conversely, if the shock does not occur for a while, they
gradually increase the belief of being in a safer state, reduce the shock probability, and
lower liquidity preference.
To highlight this information-driven ﬂuctuation in liquidity preference, we introduce a
stochastic version of Sidrauski (1967) model: people receive utility from holding money
only when the liquidity shock occurs. There are two unobservable states, between which
the economy goes back and forth according to a Markov process. The liquidity shock
follows a Poisson process in each state with a diﬀerent arrival rate. By observing whether
or not the shock occurs at each point in time, people rationally update the subjective
probability using Bayes’ law and revise the time paths of consumption and money holding.
Assuming that nominal wage adjustment is sluggish, we show that aggregate demand and
employment ﬂuctuate over time as liquidity preference varies.
The ﬂuctuation pattern depends on the frequency of the shock because one occurrence
of the shock only partially reveals information about the true state. As long as the liq-
uidity shock occurs sparsely in time, people view the shock as a mere accident. Although
consumption decreases temporarily, it quickly recovers as this optimistic view is conﬁrmed
by the subsequent observation that no shock occurs thereafter. However, when the shock
occurs many times for a short while, people are convinced that they are in the more dan-
gerous state. In this case the recovery process takes a long time even after the shock
1If they know the underlying state and it does not change over time, the expected gain of holding
money is constant. Thus, they behave as if they had a deterministic utility function of money as originally
assumed in Sidrauski (1967). This implies that the ﬂuctuation in the liquidity preference is driven not by
t h eo c c u r r e n c eo ft h es h o c kper se but by information brought by the shock.
4ceases. The recovery speed of consumption is initially slow because their pessimistic belief
is so strong that it is not easily turned over by the gradually revealed information that no
shock occurs.2 The recovery process gradually accelerates as the belief gets weaker and
more sensitive to new information, and eventually slows down again when they are quite
sure that they are in the safer state. Those results contrast with the previous studies of
informational cycles by Caplin and Leahy (1993) and Zeira (1993), where a shock, once it
occurs, completely reveals the true state.3
There are a number of attempts to explain cyclical movements of macroeconomic vari-
ables by combining unobservable regime changes and Bayesian updating agents. When
the signal is noisy, agents slowly change their belief, making the eﬀect of a regime change
more persistent than in the case where the state is perfectly observable.4 Andolfatto and
Gomme (2003) and Sill and Wrase (1999), for example, demonstrate that monetary pol-
icy has longlasting eﬀects when it periodically switches between low and high monetary
growth in an unobservable way. Other papers examine how agents react to unobservable
changes in investment opportunities. Chalkley and Lee (1998) show that recovery from a
recession is protracted when risk aversion of agents prevents them from acting promptly
2This mechanism provides a possible explanation of why it took so long a time for consumer conﬁdence
in Japan to recover after experiencing a succession of bank failures in the 1990s.
3In their models, even when a number of shocks come in a bunch, those except for the ﬁrst one conveys
almost no information because uncertainty vanishes after the ﬁrst. Thus, the number of shocks that agents
observe does not aﬀect their behavior. Boldrin and Levine (2001) also consider a related model, but they
rule out the possibility that the shock continually occurs.
4The literature of herds also examines the situation in which agents gradually receive noisy signals,
and shows that learning from others’ decisions sometimes leads to abrupt changes in aggregate variables
rather than persistence (See, for example, Chamley and Gale 1994, and Chari and Kehoe 2004). A typical
assumption in studies of herd behavior is that each agent has some private information and must make a
one-time and irreversible decision, while we consider a representative agent who chooses money holdings
at every instant.
5on receiving good news. Veldkamp (2005) and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) explain
the slow recovery by an endogenous ﬂow of information (see also Potter, 2000). If agents
have a pessimistic belief, their activities are low, generating fewer public information, and
therefore good news are only slowly revealed in bad times. Those studies are complemen-
tary to this paper, where recovery is slow not because information is scarce in recession
but people’s strong belief dwarfs the signiﬁcance of new, favorable information.5
Another distinctive feature of this paper is that the crash and the slow recovery is
produced by ﬂuctuations in consumer demand. We set up a continuous-time model in
which inﬁnitely-lived households maximize their expected utility that depends on the paths
of consumption and money holding, and characterize the dynamics of the economy as
a stationary cycle. We theoretically show that their rational, forward-looking behavior
generates a crash and a subsequent slow recovery, whereas previous related studies either
solve the model entirely by numerical procedures or consider the case where agents live
only for one period so that their decision problems are static.6
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. After modelling the belief-updating
behavior of households in the next section, we examine liquidity-preference ﬂuctuations and
the optimal consumption behavior in section 3. Section 4 derives the existence, uniqueness
and other properties of the stationary equilibrium path and presents the cyclical movements
of the belief and consumption. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. A mathematical proof
and numerical procedures are provided in the appendix.
5In fact, the ﬂow of information brought by no occurrence of the shock is largest when people are
convinced of being in the more dangerous state. However, it is also the time when their prior belief is
strongest, and hence people only slowly change it.
6Although they are not studies on cycles, Driﬃll and Miller (1993) and Zeira (1999) analytically examine
continuous-time models in which agents update their belief based on discrete signals. In their models,
however, uncertainty eventually vanishes and the economy reaches a steady state since the unobservable
s t a t ei st i m ei n v a r i a n t .
62 Liquidity Shock and Bayesian Learning
We use a continuous-time model in which a representative household faces an aggregate
liquidity shock that follows an exogenous Poisson process. Liquidity holding generates
utility when the shock actually occurs, but does not while the shock does not occur. Since
when the shock occurs cannot exactly be anticipated, even during the period without it
the household holds liquidity so as to prepare for it.
There are two underlying states with diﬀerent probabilities of the shock, called states
Ha n dL .I ns t a t ei ∈ {H,L} the shock occurs with probability θi per unit time, where
θH > θL > 0. The household cannot directly observe the current state but knows that
the state evolves according to a Markov process: state H changes to state L with Poisson
probability pH per unit time whereas state L changes to state H with probability pL.W e
assume that the shock occurs much more frequently in state H than in state L and that
the state change is a rare event when compared to the shock in state H. Formally,
Assumption 1 θH − θL >p H + pL.
By observing whether the shock occurs or not she continuously revises her subjective
shock probability in a Bayesian manner. Let θt ∈ {θH,θL} denote the true shock probabil-
ity at time t, which is unknown to her. Using information available up to time t,s h ef o r m s
a belief that current θt is θH with probability λH






t =1 f o ra l lt. (1)
In order to ﬁnd how she updates λi
t from t to t + ∆t,7 we ﬁrst obtain the subjec-
tive probability that the shock does not occur between t and t + ∆t for given λi
t.I t




,w h e r eP r o b t[·] is a probability operator based on in-
formation available at t, S(a,b] is the set of dates on which the shock actually occurs
7Time interval ∆t is taken to be so short that the probability that the liquidity shock and a state
change coexist in the interval is negligible.
7during (a,b], and φ the empty set. Since the underlying state is either H or L at time
t + ∆t, this probability is divided into two components, Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θH¤
and Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θL¤
.
Each of the two components is further divided into two probabilities. The former is
the sum of the probability that ‘the state is H at time t and neither the state change nor
the shock occurs during the interval’ and the probability that ‘the present state is L and
the state changes to H during the interval.’ It is8
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Similarly, the latter is
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Let us consider how the representative household updates her belief if she eventually
ﬁnds that the shock did not occur during (t,t + ∆t]. In this case the information that






















8Throughout the paper we ignore the second-order term of ∆t and higher because ∆t → 0.


































We next consider the case where the shock occurs during (t,t + ∆t]. Since
Probt
£





t∆t for i ∈ {L,H}, (7)


















which is consistent with (4). From Bayes’ law dividing (7) by (8) gives the updated
subjective probability that θt+∆t = θi under the condition that the shock occurs during















where subscript t − 0 represents the state just before t.
Finally, we obtain the dynamics of subjective probability θe











θH − θL. (10)
Substituting (6) and (10) into the time derivative of (5) yields the time derivative of θe
t in















t)f o r t/ ∈ S(0,∞). (11)
Under Assumption 1, this function hasa n‘ U ’ - s h a p ea si l l u s t r a t e di nﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure
shows that
g(θ) Q 0 ⇐⇒ θ R θ





,w h e r e
θ
∗ ≡
θL + θH + pL + pH −
p






t+∆t is analogously obtained. From (1) it equals 1 − λH
t+∆t.
9Similarly, by substituting (9) and (10) into (5) we obtain the value of θe
t as a function
of θe











t−0)f o r t ∈ S(0,∞). (13)










Equations (13) and (11) respectively describe the dynamics of θe
t with and without the
shock. They jointly show that θe
t ﬂuctuates within interval
¡
θ∗,θH¤
. The liquidity shock
is a rare event, and therefore causes a discrete change in people’s expectation about the
present state once it occurs. As function h(θe) is located above the 45-degree line in Figure
2, the more often people observe the shock, the more strongly they believe that they are
in state H, and hence θe
t becomes closer to θH.
Conversely, in the absence of the shock people gradually become more and more opti-
mistic and conﬁdent that the economy is in state L. Thus, their subjective probability of
the shock gradually declines, converging to θ∗.10 However, the U-shape of function g(θe
t)
implies that the speed of adjusting their belief is slow when θe
t is near θH.N o t e t h a t
θe
t ≈ θH is equivalent to λH
t ≈ 1 from (10), which means that the precision of the prior
belief is quite high (i.e., people are quite sure that the current state is H). In that case any
additional information has only a small impact on the posterior belief.
3 Liquidity Preference and Consumption Behavior
In this section, we investigate how the aforementioned ﬂuctuations in the representative
household’s belief aﬀects her liquidity preference and consumption behavior. Before doing
that, we brieﬂy describe the basic structure and production side of the economy.
10θe
t never becomes lower than θ∗(> θL) since people take into account the possibility that state L might
have changed to state H even though the shock does not occur.
10The economy is inhabited by the representative households with measure one. Each
household is inﬁnitely lived and supplies labor to a representative ﬁrm. The ﬁrm produces
y`t units of commodity, where `t is the level of labor input and y is a constant input-output
coeﬃcient.11 Since there is no investment in our setting and thus consumption ct equals
total commodity demand, total labor demand `t is
`t = ct/y. (14)
In this economy, money aﬀects real variables through the sluggishness of nominal wage
adjustment. Instead of explicitly introducing the adjustment cost of nominal wages, we
simply assume that there is a reduced-form relationship between labor demand `t and the
rate of nominal wage adjustment ˙ Wt/Wt,
˙ Wt/Wt = f(`t − 1),f
0(·) ≥ 0,f (0) = 0, (15)
i.e., the rate of nominal wage adjustment is an increasing function of labor demand in
excess of the ‘natural’ level, the latter being normalized to unity. Given Wt,t h ep e r f e c t
adjustment of commodity price Pt always yields
Wt/Pt ≡ wt = y, (16)
which shows that real wage wt is constant. Thus, from (15), the inﬂation rate is determined
as a function of commodity demand ct:
πt ≡ ˙ Pt/Pt = f(ct/y − 1). (17)
Note that equation (17) implies that y is the level of consumption (=output) at which the
price level become constant.
11Labor supplied by each household is potentially diﬀerentiated. In that case ‘y`t’ should be considered
as the amount of output when the representative ﬁrm employs the same amount of labor from each
household.
11N e x t ,w ed e s c r i b et h ed e m a n ds i d e .W ei n t r o d u c eas t o c h a s t i cv e r s i o no ft h eS i d r a u s k i
model that incorporates the random liquidity shock. The representative household gains
utility only from consumption ct when the shock does not occur. However, when it occurs,
she gains utility not only from consumption but also from money holding mt. Her expected














where constant ρ is her subjective discount rate, and function u(·) represents the instanta-
neous felicity from consumption satisfying twice diﬀerentiability and the Inada conditions.
Constant β speciﬁes the marginal beneﬁt from money holding, and therefore βmτe−ρ(τ−t)
gives the discounted utility from money if she encounters a liquidity shock at date τ.I t
is summed over τ ∈ S(t,∞),w h e r eS(t,∞) represents the discrete set of dates on which the
shock occurs.12
The household chooses assets among money and the complete set of contingent claims
for future commodities. However, since all households are identical, money is the only asset
that they hold after all arbitrage opportunities are exploited.13 We assume that nominal
money supply is constant and that there is no tax-cum-subsidy.14 Thus, the ﬂow budget
12This setting is obviously a simplifying approximation. In reality, a ﬁnancial crisis does not instantly
terminate but continues for a few days so that a household receives, say, utility ﬂow ˜ βmτ0e−ρ(τ
0−t) through-
out τ0 ∈ [τ,τ + T]. Since each period of ﬁnancial crisis is typically short, we approximate the total utility
received from money holding during one occurence of the shock by βmτe−ρ(τ−t),w h e r eβ ≡ ˜ βT.
13We later consider a complete set of contingent assets to derive arbitrage conditions that deﬁne the
optimal behavior of agents. However, we obtain the same result even in the absence of some contingent
assets since in equilibrium there is no need for homogeneous households to sell and buy them to each
other. Also note that the ownership of ﬁrms has no value in the present setting since ﬁrms use only labor
and their proﬁts are always zero. If physical capital exists, however, another state variable is introduced,
which might more or less aﬀect the result.
14The assumption of constant money supply is not essential. In fact, as shown below, the level of money
12equation is
˙ mt = wt`t − πtmt − ct. (19)
Having the belief mentioned in the previous section, the representative household chooses
the time paths of consumption and money holding so as to maximize the expected utility
(18) subject to (19).
Objective function (18) depends on only ct, mt and the expected pattern of the shock,
the last of which is fully described by θe
t since θe
t is a suﬃcient statistic for θt that governs
the current and future probabilities of the shock. Constraint (19) depends on wt, `t and
πt, all of which are determined by only ct on the equilibrium path, as seen from (14), (16)
and (17). Therefore, from the perspective of the household that determines ct, the current
status is fully summarized by mt and θe
t. Thus, given the recursive structure of the model,
the movement of ct on the path of stationary dynamics must completely be expressed as
af u n c t i o no fmt and θe
t.15 Furthermore, since objective function (18) and constraint (19)
are both linear in mt, the optimal choice of ct is independent of the level of mt.16 Thus, ct




t)f o r a l l t. (20)
Since θe
t ﬂuctuates within interval (θ∗,θH], as shown in the previous section, we only
need to characterize the shape of function C(θe
t)i nt h i si n t e r v a l . 17 To this end we examine
stock does not aﬀect the household behavior in the present setting.
15This strategy for ﬁnding stationary dynamics is analogous to Lucas (1978) who analyzes the determi-
nation of equilibrium price behavior under an exogenous production shock that follows a Markov process.
16The linearity of the utility function with respect to mt is assumed primarily for showing how the
ﬂuctuation in liquidity preference aﬀects the consumption path of the utility-maximizing household in
the simplest setting. When the marginal utility of holding money is variable, we actually ﬁnd that the
equilibrium dynamics of ct depends on both θe
t and mt. It substantially complicates the analysis but does
not aﬀect our main results, such as the pattern of recovery.
17In the following it is assumed that θe
t ∈ (θ∗,θH] unless otherwise noticed.
13the ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s optimizing behavior.
Let 1 − µ(θe
t)∆t denote the price of the claim to a unit of the commodity at t + ∆t
measured in terms of the commodity at t under the condition that the shock does not
occur between t and t+∆t. Note that it is a function of θe
t because the value of the claim
depends on the probability with which the contingent event occurs.18 If the shock does not
occur during the interval, consumption increases from C(θe
t)t oC(θe
t + g(θe
t)∆t)s i n c eθe
t
changes by the amount of g(θe
t)∆t, as shown by (11). Since the probability that the shock
does not occur during this interval is 1 − θe
t∆t, as given by (4), the ﬁrst-order condition






























t)f o r a l l θe
t, (21)
where γ(c) ≡− u00(c)c/u0(c) represents the degree of risk aversion.
Analogously, let ν(θe
t)∆t denote the price of the contingent claim to a unit of the
commodity at t+∆t under the condition that the shock does occur between t and t+∆t.
When the shock occurs, consumption jumps from C(θe
t)t oC(h(θe
t)), as seen from (13).
Since the shock probability is θe
t∆t, as shown by (8), the ﬁrst-order condition between the
























Next, let us consider the arbitrage between these contingent claims and a risk-free
asset, such as a riskless bond. Let rt be the real interest rate of a risk-free asset, then the
18In addition, θe
t aﬀects consumption and therefore the marginal utility of consumption.
14price of a risk-free claim to the future commodity at t + ∆t is e−rt∆t. Since the claim is
equivalent to the asset of the synthesis of the claim contingent on the absence of the shock
whose price is 1−µ(θe














t)f o r a l l t. (23)






















Applying (11) and (20) to (24) leads to the dynamics of ct (≡ C(θe

















for t/ ∈ S(0,∞), (25)
which is the Keynes-Ramsey rule in the present setting. Note that it is the same as the
standard one except for the third term in brackets of the right-hand side. This term
represents a jump in the marginal utility caused by the shock. If ct declines after the
shock, causing the marginal utility of consumption to increase, this term is positive and
thus the growth rate of ct is higher than would obtain in the standard Ramsey model.
That is, since the representative household anticipates a possible increase in the marginal
utility of consumption, she tries to reallocate consumption from the present to the future,
raising the growth rate of consumption during the period without the shock.
Having examined the household’s intertemporal optimization of consumption, we now
turn to the optimal choice between consumption and money holding. By holding a one-unit
money between time t and t + ∆t, the household loses (rt + πt)∆t units of consumption,
or equivalently (rt +πt)u0(ct)∆t units in terms of utility, when compared to holding a unit
15of risk-free asset during this period. At this cost a one-unit increase in real money holding
raises the household’s utility (18) by β if the shock occurs. Since the subjective probability
that the shock occurs between t and t + ∆t is θe
t∆t, the increase in the expected utility is
βθe
t∆t.T h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt should equal the marginal cost on the optimal path, which
yields the ﬁrst-order condition between money holding and consumption:




for all t. (26)
Equation (26) implies the well-known property–i.e., the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and real money holding equals the nominal rate of interest.














Intuitively, function R(·) represents the household’s preference for liquidity, deﬁned by the
expected utility gain minus capital loss from holding money for a unit time. Given the
amount of consumption, the preference for liquidity is stronger when the subjective shock







> 0 for all θ
e
t > 0a n dct > 0. (28)
Equation (27) requires that the rate of return from a risk-free asset (riskless bonds),
rt, should be equalized to R(·)f o ra l lt.A l s o ,rt must be consistent with Euler equation































Function C(·) is determined so that it satisﬁes diﬀerential equation (29). To pin down C(·),
however, we also need a boundary condition. If ˙ ct/ct remains positive as θe
t approaches
steady-state value θ∗,t h e nct unboundedly explodes. Conversely, if ˙ ct/ct remains negative
16as θe
t → θ∗, ct converges to zero, violating the transversality condition. We rule out such












under which ˙ ct/ct given by (25) approaches zero as θe
t → θ∗.
Equations (29) and (30) determine the whole shape of C(θe




Once it is determined, applying the dynamics of θe
t given by (11) and (13) to it provides
the dynamic path of ct.
4 Crisis and Recovery
This section investigates the shape of the consumption path determined by (29) and (30).
Note that the right-hand side of diﬀerential equation (29) includes C(h(θ)) along with θ
and C(θ), implying that we cannot simply illustrate a phase diagram.20 Therefore, we
theoretically examine basic properties of function C(θ) and then numerically obtain a
typical shape of it.
For the tractability of the analysis we assume the following two properties regarding
u(·)a n df(·), which are stated in terms of function R(·)d e ﬁned by (27).
Assumption 2 limc→0 R(θH,c) < ρ and limc→∞ R(θ∗,c) > ρ.
Assumption 3 Rc(θe,c) is continuous and positive for all θe ∈ [θ∗,θH] and c>0,w h e r e
Rc(θe,c) ≡ ∂R(θe,c)/∂c.
If the household’s preference for liquidity, given by R(·), is stronger than her preference
for present consumption ρ, she postpones consumption and holds more money. Therefore,
19Throughout this paper we use operator ‘lim’ to denote the right-hand limit.
20This type of equation is called a diﬀerence-diﬀerential equation or a delay diﬀerence equation.
17in Assumption 2 the ﬁrst condition implies that she prefers consumption to liquidity hold-
ing when her consumption is quite low even if she expects the highest shock probability
θH. The second condition implies that she prefers liquidity holding to consumption when
her consumption is suﬃciently high even if she expects the lowest shock probability θ∗.
Assumption 3 extends this relationship between ct and R(·) to a smooth and monotonic
one under a given θe
t–i.e., as consumption increases, liquidity preference rises as long as
the state of expectation about the shock is unchanged.
Under the two assumptions we ﬁnd the existence, and a few properties, of function
C(θe)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (29) and (30):
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists a unique function C(θe) that
satisﬁes (29) and (30). It is strictly downward sloping for any θe ∈ (θ∗,θH] and has




P r o o f .S e eA p p e n d i xA .
Given initial belief θe
0 and the history of the liquidity shock S(0,t],t h ep a t ho fθe
t is
uniquely determined by (11) and (13). Therefore, the uniqueness of function C(·)i m p l i e s
that of the consumption path: ct = C(θe
t). The negative relationship between θe
t and
ct provides an intuitive ﬁgure of the dynamics. Figure 1 shows ˙ θe
t < 0f o ra n y( θ∗,θH],
implying that subjective shock probability θe
t gradually declines while the shock does not
occur. Thus, preference for liquidity gradually decreases and consumption grows. When
the shock occurs, people discretely increase θe
t to h(θe
t), as illustrated in Figure 2, causing a
negative jump in consumption to occur. If the shock does not occur for a while, people again
gradually become optimistic and raise consumption. In this way, consumption persistently
ﬂuctuates within ﬁnite interval [c,c].
Note that as the preference for liquidity (i.e., money) changes, not only the demand
for consumption but also preferences for all kinds of assets, including riskless bonds, vary
18over time. However, since there is no stickiness in the price of assets, the rate of return for
each asset is adjusted so that the excess demand for any asset other than money is always
zero. By contrast, the price of goods cannot change ﬂexibly because of the sluggishness
in nominal wage adjustment, and therefore the changes in the liquidity preference have
quantitative eﬀects on consumption.
To obtain a typical shape of function C(θe) and the dynamics of consumption more
clearly, we numerically analyze the dynamics by assuming
u(ct)=l o gct and f(`t − 1) = α · (`t − 1) where α is constant. (32)
In this setting, Assumptions 2 and 3 reduce to the following:21
βyθ
∗ > α, ρ > α.
In the numerical calculation we choose parameter values so that these conditions as well
as Assumption 1 are satisﬁed.22
Figure 3 illustrates the shape of C(θe
t) obtained from the numerical analysis. It is in
fact downward sloping from c∗ ≡ C(θ∗)t ocH ≡ C(θH). If the shock does not occur while
θe
t moves from θH to θ∗ a c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 1 1 ) ,C(θe
t)m o v e sa l o n gt h es o l i dc u r v ei n
Figure 4. Note that consumption ﬁrst grows slowly, gradually accelerates, and eventually
slows down again as it approaches c∗–i.e., it traces an S-shaped trajectory.
The intuition behind is clear from the U-shape of function g(θe
t) as depicted in Figure
1. If people strongly believe that they are in state H and thus θe
t is very close to θH,
21Using a money-in-utility model without uncertainty Ono (1994, pp.86-88; 2001) shows that in the case
where βy>α and ρ > α there is a unique saddle-stable path. Furthermore, the path accommodates a
persistent demand shortage when ρ < βy, whereas it reaches a full-employment steady state when ρ > βy.
The present condition is the same as his condition except that the former includes shock probability θ∗.
22Speciﬁcally, θH = .4, θL = .05, pH = .025, pL = .1, y =1 ,ρ = .05, α = .025, and β = .4. Under these
parameter values, we obtain θ∗ ≈ .069, c∗ ≈ 1.3a n dcH ≈ .60. Details of the numerical procedure are
described in Appendix B.
19they do not signiﬁcantly alter their pessimistic view for a while. In fact, the speed of
change in θe
t,g i v e nb y|g(θe
t)|,i st h e ns m a l la n dt h u sc o n s u m p t i o ni n c r e a s e sv e r ys l o w l y .
As the period without the shock lasts, θe
t decreases and |g(θe
t)| increases, as Figure 1 shows.
People become more and more optimistic and thus θe
t declines faster, which accelerates the
recovery speed of consumption. As θe
t approaches to steady-state value θ∗, people become
quite conﬁdent that they are in state L, and hence an additional period without the shock
provides little information. |g(θe
t)| approaches zero and the growth rate of consumption
converges to zero.
Once the liquidity shock occurs, however, their consumption jumps downward since the
subjective shock probability jumps upward, raising their liquidity preference. Consumption
falls from C(θe
t)t oC(h(θe
t)), the latter being depicted by the dashed curve in Figure
4 (where vertical arrows express the magnitude of each fall). Thereafter the recovery
process ‘restarts’ from the point that corresponds to the decreased level of consumption
(as indicated by horizontal arrows) and consumption again traces the solid curve. If the
shock continually occurs for a short period, the subjective probability successively increases
and C(θe
t) approaches the lowest level cH. Thereafter, consumption recovers along the S-
shaped trajectory, as mentioned above.
Finally, by simulating the Markov process of the underlying state and the Poisson
process for the shock, we numerically obtain an example of the realized time paths of
θt, θe
t and ct. Figure 5 illustrates them. Consumption in fact traces an S-shaped path,
especially after a bunch of liquidity shocks make it close to the lowest value cH.S i n c e
the inﬂation rate is given by (17) and y is located between c∗ and cH under the present
parameter values, in the recovery process serious deﬂation initially occurs, then its rate
reduces, and eventually a boom comes and inﬂation arises after c exceeds y.I ft h es h o c k
occurs infrequently and hence people do not become too pessimistic, the recovery process
starts before deﬂation occurs and consumption quickly converges to c∗.
It is also worth noting that realized booms and depressions do not exactly match the
20underlying state of the economy but follow the subjective probability that people have
in mind. Even when the economy switches to state H and thus the true probability of
the shock jumps up, people do not increase money holding until they actually observe it.
Analogously, even if the true shock probability jumps down, they still keep strong liquidity
preference and thus the recovery speed is very slow for a while once they become very
pessimistic.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Liquidity preference depends on people’s belief about how frequently they encounter crises
in which liquidity is needed. This paper has examined the way they update the belief based
on Bayesian inference and its eﬀect on their preference for liquidity holding over consump-
tion, in a circumstance where the economy shifts between two unobservable states with
diﬀerent probabilities of the liquidity shock. Each time they observe the shock, they raise
their subjective probability of being in the more dangerous state and increase preference
for holding money over consumption. The longer the period without the shock lasts, the
larger probability people attach to the safer state and increase preference for consump-
tion over money holding. With incomplete nominal wage adjustment, such movements in
liquidity preference ﬂuctuate aggregate demand.
The magnitude and persistence of ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand depend on the
realized frequency of the shock, which does not necessarily match the underlying state of
the economy. As long as the shock occurs sparsely in time, it has only a minor eﬀect on
the belief and hence the economic recovery thereafter is fast. However, if people observe
the shock many times for a short while, they hold a strong belief of being in the more
dangerous state and reduce consumption a lot. Once it occurs, it takes a long time for
them to reverse their belief and increase consumption. In this process, the recovery speed
is ﬁrst slow, then gradually accelerates, and eventually declines, tracing an S-shaped curve.
21Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of C(θ) to be downward sloping23
Before starting the proof we deﬁne D(θ):







Since D(θ) is the expression in brackets of (29) and (11) shows g(θ)t ob en e g a t i v ef o ra l l
θ ∈ (θ∗,θH],
C
0(θ) S 0 ⇐⇒ D(θ) T 0. (34)
Using function D(θ)w eﬁrst prove
Lemma 1 Suppose that C(θ) satisﬁes (29) and that there exists θ0 ∈ [θ∗,θH) satisfying
limθ→θ0 D(θ)=0 . Then, under Assumption 3, C(θ) is strictly downward sloping for all
θ ∈ (θ0,θH].
Proof: If Lemma 1 does not hold and hence C(·) is weakly upward sloping somewhere in
(θ0,θH], either of the following must be the case.
(i) There exists some θA ∈ [θ0,θH)s u c ht h a tl i m θ→θA D(θ)=0a n dC0(θ) ≥ 0 for all
θ ∈ (θA,θH].
(ii) There exist some θA ∈ [θ0,θH)a n dθB ∈ (θA,θH) such that limθ→θA D(θ)=D(θB)=
0, C0(θ) ≥ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ (θA,θB], and C0(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θB,θH].
Intuitively, if the lemma is false, we can choose interval (θA,θB]i nw h i c hf u n c t i o nC(θ)i s
weakly increasing, θA is either a local minimum or θ0,a n dθB is either a local maximum
or θH. If there are multiple intervals of such, we choose the rightmost one. We shall ﬁnd
n e i t h e r( i )n o r( i i )t ob ev a l i d .
23In Appendices A and B we use θ instead of θe
t to minimize notation.
22We ﬁrst show that case (i) leads to a contradiction. Since Rc > 0 from Assumption 3
and Rθ > 0 from (28), in case (i)
lim
θ→θA R(C(θ),θ) <R (C(θ
H),θ
H). (35)
Since h(θA) ∈ (θA,θH), limθ→θA C(θ) ≤ C(h(θA)) whereas C(θH)=C(h(θH)) since
h(θH)=θH from (13). Since applying these properties and (35) to (33) implies 0 =
limθ→θA D(θ) <D (θH) in case (i), from (34) we ﬁnd C0(θH) < 0, which contradicts (i).
In case (ii) limθ→θA C(θ) ≤ C(θB). Since Rc > 0f r o mA s s u m p t i o n3a n dRθ > 0f r o m
(28), this inequality implies
lim
θ→θA R(C(θ),θ) <R (C(θ
B),θ
B). (36)
Further, h(θA) is located in either (θA,θB]o r( θB,θH). If h(θA) ∈ (θA,θB], then
C(h(θA)) ≥ limθ→θA C(θ) since we suppose C0(θ) ≥ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ (θA,θB]. Contrast-
ingly, C(h(θB)) ≤ C(θB)s i n c eh(θB) ∈ (θB,θH)a n dC0(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θB,θH]. Using
these inequalities, (33) and (36) we ﬁnd limθ→θA D(θ) <D (θB), which contradicts case
(ii).
If h(θA) ∈ (θB,θH), then because h0(θ) > 0f r o m( 1 3 ) ,w eﬁnd θA < θB <h (θA) <
h(θB) < θH. In case (ii), this means
lim
















Applying this property and (36) to (33) yields limθ→θA D(θ) <D (θB), which contradicts
case (ii). Thus, anyway case (ii) results in a contradiction. ¥
From (33), boundary condition (30) is equivalent to limθ→θ∗ D(θ)=0 . By regarding θ∗
as θ0 in Lemma 1, we ﬁnd C(θ)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (29) and (30) to be strictly downward sloping
for all θ ∈ (θ∗,θH].
23The existence of upper and lower bounds for C(θ)















Applying this property and Assumption 3 to thei n t e r m e d i a t ev a l u et h e o r e mi m p l i e st h a t
there are unique and positive c and c satisfying (31). Furthermore, since R(θH,c) >
R(θ∗,c)=ρ = R(θH,c), Assumption 3 implies c>c .
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that C(θ) satisﬁes (29) and that there exists θ0 ∈ [θ∗,θH) satisfying
limθ→θ0 D(θ)=0 . Then, under Assumptions 2 and 3, C(θ) ∈ [c,c] for all θ ∈ (θ0,θH].
Proof: A ss h o w nb yL e m m a1 ,t h el a s tt e r mi n( 3 3 )i sp o s i t i v ew h e nθ → θ0 and hence
lim
θ→θ0 R(θ,C(θ)) < ρ. (37)
From the ﬁrst equation of (31), (28), and Assumption 3, R(θ,c) > ρ for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θH]
and c>c. Thus, (37) implies limθ→θ0 C(θ) ≤ c.
When θ = θH, the last term in (33) equals zero since h(θH)=θH from (13). Since





Comparing this property with the second equation of (31) and using Assumption 3 yield
C(θH) ≥ c. Furthermore, the monotonicity of C(θ)f r o mL e m m a1i m p l i e sC(θ) ∈
[C(θH),limθ→θ0 C(θ)] ⊆ [c,c]f o ra l lθ ∈ (θ0,θH]. ¥
Under condition (30), θ∗ satisﬁes the requirement for θ0 in Lemma 2. Thus, C(θ) ∈ [c,c]
for all θ ∈ (θ∗,θH].
24The uniqueness of C(θ)






where cH(> 0) is an arbitrary constant. We can solve diﬀerential equation (29) backward
from θ = θH with boundary condition (38), because h(θ)i sl a r g e rt h a nθ and thus C(θ)
and C(h(θ)) are already known when we calculate the gradient of C(·)a tθ.24 Therefore,
function e C(θ,c H) is uniquely determined within interval (θ∗,θH].




H)=0 , where (39)
e D(θ,c
H) ≡ R(θ, e C(θ,c







e D(θ,c H) is the expression in brackets of (29) with C(θ) being replaced by e C(θ,c H). Func-
tions e C(·)a n d e D(·) have the following properties:25
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 3, (a) e Cc(θ,c H) > 0 and (b) e Dc(θ,c H) > 0 for all θ ∈
(θ∗,θH] and cH > 0. In addition, (c) there is a constant, Dc,s u c ht h a te Dc(θ,c H) >D c > 0
whenever e C(θ,c H) ∈ [c,c].
Proof: By rearranging terms in (29),
e D(θ,c
H)=g(θ)
















24The numerical analysis follows this way. See Appendix B for it.
25 e Cc(θ,c H) ≡ ∂ e C(θ,c H)/∂cH. e Dc(θ,c H) and other partial derivatives are deﬁned likewise.






























H) < 0. (45)
From (13), h(θH)=θH and thus Ψ(θH,c H) = 0. Using this property, Assumption 3, (38),






Now we extend this property to all θ ∈ (θ∗,θH]. To prove this, suppose otherwise.
Then, there should be some θA ∈ (θ∗,θH)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes e Dc(θ,c H) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θA,θH]


























H)/g(θ)dθ > 0, (47)
which means Ψ(θA,c H) > 0. Substituting these results into (44) yields e Dc(θA,c H) > 0,
which contradicts the assumption that e Dc(θA,c H) ≤ 0. Thus there is no such θA,a n d
therefore property (b)h o l d s .
Property (b)a n d( 4 3 )i m p l y
Mθc(θ,c
H) > 0f o r a l l θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
H]a n dc
H > 0. (48)






H) < 0f o r a l l θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
H]. (49)
S i n c e( 4 9 )i se q u i v a l e n tt oe Cc(θ,c H) > 0 from (42), property (a)h o l d s .





From Assumption 3, Φ(θ,c) is positive and continuous for all (θ,c) ∈ Θ ≡ [θ∗,θH] × [c,c].
Since Θ is a compact set, there exists Dc ≡ min(θ,c)∈Θ Φ(θ,c) > 0. Combined with (44),
(48) and (49), this property implies
e Dc(θ,c
H) > Φ(θ,c





whenever e C(θ,c H) ∈ [c,c]. ¥
We now prove the uniqueness of function C(θ) using Lemmata 2 and 3. Suppose that
there are two distinct functions C1(θ)a n dC2(θ) both of which satisfy (29) and (30). Let
cH
1 ≡ C1(θH)a n dcH
2 ≡ C2(θH). Then C1(θ)=e C(θ,c H
1 )a n dC2(θ)=e C(θ,c H
2 ) for all
θ ∈ (θ∗,θH]. Note that cH
1 6= cH
2 b e c a u s ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tC1(θ)a n dC2(θ)a r e









2 )=0 . (50)
From Lemma 2, e C(θ,c H
1 ), e C(θ,c H
2 ) ∈ [c,c]f o ra l lθ ∈ (θ∗,θH]. Applying it to property
(a) of Lemma 3 implies e C(θ,c H) ∈ [c,c]f o ra l lcH ∈ [cH
1 ,c H
2 ]a n da l lθ ∈ (θ∗,θH]. Thus, we
can use property (c) of Lemma 3 to obtain
lim
θ→θ∗ | e D(θ,c
H
1 ) − e D(θ,c
H




2 |Dc > 0, (51)
which contradicts (50).
27The existence of C(θ)
We obtain another property with respect to e D(θ,c H).
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions 2 and 3, (a) e D(θ,c) < 0 and (b) e D(θ,c) > 0 for all
θ ∈ (θ∗,θH).
Proof: We ﬁrst prove property (a). From (28) and (31),
R(θ
H,c)=ρ and R(θ,c) < ρ for all θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
H). (52)
Since (13) implies h(θH)=θH, substituting (38) and (52) into (40) yields
e D(θ
H,c)=0 . (53)
Since (41) and (53) imply e Cθ(θH,c)=0 ,a n dRθ > 0 from (28), diﬀerentiating (40) with
respect to θ when θ = θH gives
e Dθ(θ
H,c)=Rθ(θ
H,c) > 0. (54)
Equations (53) and (54) show that there is a small ε (> 0) such that e D(θ,c) < 0 for all
θ ∈ (θH − ε,θH).
We now extend the negativity of e D(θ,c)t ot h ew h o l ei n t e r v a lo f( θ∗,θH). To see this,
suppose otherwise. Then, there must be some θA ∈ (θ∗,θH)s u c ht h a te D(θ,c) < 0 for all
θ ∈ (θA,θH)a n dt h a te D(θA,c) ≥ 0. Since e D<0 ⇔ e Cθ > 0 from (41) and the negativity
of g(θ) in (11), we obtain e C(θA,c) < e C(h(θA),c) < e C(θH,c)=c. With Assumption 3
and (52), these inequalities yield R(θA, e C(θA,c)) <R (θA,c) < ρ and hence from (40)
e D(θA,c) < 0, which is a contradiction.
Next we prove property (b). From Assumptions 2 and 3,
R(θ,c) > ρ for all θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
H]. (55)
It implies e D(θH,c) > 0f r o m( 4 0 )s i n c eh(θH)=θH from (13). To prove that this inequality
actually holds for whole (θ∗,θH], suppose otherwise. Then, there should be some θA ∈
28(θ∗,θH)s u c ht h a te D(θ,c) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θA,θH]a n dt h a te D(θA,c) ≤ 0. From (34), we
ﬁnd e C(θA,c) > e C(h(θA),c) > e C(θH,c)=c. With Assumption 3 and (55), these inequalities
imply R(θA, e C(θA,c)) >R (θA,c) > ρ and therefore from (40) e D(θA,c) > 0, which is again
a contradiction. ¥
Applying property (b) of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to the intermediate value theorem
assures that, for any given θ0 ∈ (θ∗,θH), there uniquely exists cH ∈ [c,c]t h a ts a t i s ﬁes
e D(θ0,c H) = 0. That is, there is a unique function, cH = ζ(θ0), satisfying
e D(θ
0,ζ(θ




From Lemmata 1 and 2, function e C(θ,ζ(θ0)) is monotonic and bounded by [c,c]w i t h i n
interval θ ∈ (θ0,θH]. By taking limit as θ0 → θ∗,w ec o n c l u d et h a tC(θ)=e C(θ,c H∗)i s
monotonic and bounded for all θ ∈ (θ∗,θH], where cH∗ ≡ limθ0→θ∗ ζ(θ0).26 This implies ct
should neither explode, implode nor oscillate. Thus ˙ ct/ct → 0a sθe
t → θ∗,w h i c hg i v e st h e
validity of boundary condition (30).
Appendix B: Numerical procedure of ﬁnding C(·)
Our problem is generally called an IVP (initial value problem), which is usually solved
by ﬁnite diﬀerence methods, such as the Runge-Kutta method and the Euler method.27
However, we cannot use them since the right-hand side of (29) contains C(h(θ)), which
makes impossible to calculate the gradient of C(θ)b e f o r eC(h(θ)) is determined. Since
h(θ)i sa l w a y sl a r g e rt h a nθ, we cannot solve the diﬀerential equation forward from θ∗,
where the boundary condition is given, toward θH. Instead, we can solve it backward from
26Note that ζ(θ) is bounded by c and c from Lemma 2. In addition, by totally diﬀerentiating (56) and
utilizing Lemma 1, we can prove that ζ(θ) is continuous and monotonic for all θ ∈ (θ∗,θH]. It means that
ζ(θ0) does not oscillate as θ0 → θ∗, hence the existence of cH∗ ≡ limθ0→θ∗ ζ(θ0) is guaranteed.
27See, for example, Judd (1998).
29θH toward θ∗, during which C(h(θ)) is already known when we calculate the gradient of
C(θ).
This strategy, however, involves another diﬃculty because the value of the function at
the starting point, cH ≡ C(θH), is not predetermined. Thus, we have to ﬁnd an appropriate
initial value cH such that boundary condition (30) is eventually met when (29) is solved
from it.28 This method is in fact used when we prove proposition 1 in appendix A–i.e.,
we show that there is a unique cH∗ ∈ [c,c]t h a ts a t i s ﬁes this property. In the numerical
analysis we calculate cH∗ in the following way:
Step 1. Let i =0 ,h0 = c and l0 = c.
Step 2. Let cH
i =( hi +li)/2. Using the Euler method, solve diﬀerential equation (29) (to
which (32) is applied) backward starting from boundary value C(θH)=cH
i .
Step 3. If C(θ) exceeds c during the calculation, or if D(θ)d e ﬁned by (33) remains positive
when θ approaches θ∗,l e thi+1 = cH
i and li+1 = li.C o n v e r s e l y , i f C0(θ)b e c o m e s
positive during the calculation or if D(θ) remains negative when θ approaches θ∗,l e t
hi+1 = hi and li+1 = cH
i .O t h e r w i s e ,cH
i is the solution.
Step 4. Let i = i +1 .
Step 5. Repeat steps 2-4 until hi and li get suﬃciently close to each other. Then admit
cH =( hi + li)/2a st h es o l u t i o n .
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Figure 4: Dynamics of consumption25 50 75 100

















e Figure 5: Realized paths of µt, µt and ct